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Abstract
In the categorized list procedure, subjects study words from semantic categories, then
take a recognition test on those items. Subjects are likely to recognize common (high
output dominance) category members even when they are not studied. Across three
experiments, we sought to extend the categorized list procedure, further develop an
explanation of why false recognition of category members occurs in this procedure, and
modulate false recognition of category members by manipulating encoding and retrieval
phases. Experiment 1 extended previous categorized list research, showing that subjects
are likely to false alarm with high confidence to high output dominance category
members that were not studied. Experiment 2 attempted to improve subjects’
metacognitive awareness of the deceptive nature of categorized lists by eliminating
unrelated lures from the test list. This manipulation decreased the overall false alarm
rate, but did not eliminate the relationship between output dominance and false alarm
rate. Experiment 3 sought to reduce false recognition by providing subjects additional
study and test events on the material. Providing subjects feedback on their tests followed
by an additional study period to relearn the material was generally successful in
eliminating high confidence false alarms at final test for frequent category members that
were not studied. The results converge to imply that (1) the categorized list procedure is
a robust method for investigating false recognition, (2) false recognition for high output
dominance items may be related to source monitoring errors during testing caused by
processes at encoding (e.g., Dewhurst, 2001), and (3) these high confidence false
memories are relatively resistant to manipulations intended to minimize them.
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Often Wrong but Never in Doubt:
Categorized Lists Produce Confident False Memories
Although the general issue of false memory has been of considerable applied
interest for forensic investigators and eyewitness testimony experts, the topic has also
enjoyed a spotlight in the cognitive laboratory. Research carried out in this area generally
occurs as follows: subjects come into the laboratory and study a set of materials such as
pictures, words, sentences, or stories and then take a final recall or recognition test.
Often, the characteristics or composition of the studied materials cause false memories to
occur; items that were not studied (pictures, sentences, or words) are recognized or
recalled, sometimes at high rates. Examining the memory errors that arise in these
experiments not only helps explain why these errors occur, but also may provide
information about the cognitive processes underlying normal (i.e., non-illusory) memory
performance (Roediger, 1996).
The study of false memory is particularly compelling because subjects not only
remember events and words that were not studied, but also sometimes remember them
with extreme confidence. Metacognition — that is, individuals’ monitoring and control
over their own thinking — often breaks down in certain experiments, resulting in
strikingly self-assured wrong answers. These high confidence false memories have some
significant implications for applied and theoretical memory science.
A variety of methods to study high confidence false memories in the research
laboratory have been developed to address both theoretical and applied issues. Among
them are the misinformation procedure (Loftus, 1975; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978); the
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false fame procedure (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989); the plurality recognition test
(Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000; Mickes, Hwe, Wais, & Wixted, 2011; Wixted,
2011); the use of deceptive sentences (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Brewer, Sampaio, &
Barlow, 2005; Sampaio & Brewer, 2009), and the Deese-Roediger-McDermott procedure
(DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Although how these studies are
conducted appears similar, the theoretical mechanisms by which memory errors arise in
these procedures seem to differ (see Marsh, Eslick, & Fazio, 2008, for a review).
Researchers have relied on these methods for a number of purposes, ranging from making
claims about the forensic relevance of evidence to developing theoretical models of
different memory processes.
One evolving method for investigating false memories uses categorized lists —
lists of words organized by semantic category (e.g., Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Smith,
Ward, Tindell, Sifonis, & Wilkenfeld, 2000). A “birds” list, for instance, may contain a
variety of exemplars ranging from common members of the category, like “robin,” to less
common members, like “ostrich.” Studies using these materials have found that
participants often falsely recall or falsely recognize items that were not presented,
especially items that are common to or typical of the category (Smith et al., 2000).
Although categorized list methods have revealed interesting patterns of data, as discussed
below, the use of these materials and the theories underlying them remain somewhat
underdeveloped, and many questions remain unanswered.
In this thesis, we suggest a revised procedure to examine high confidence false
memories using categorized lists. Besides developing a refined categorized list method
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to study high confidence false memories, this thesis seeks to evaluate (1) the theoretical
mechanisms that underlie the false memories evoked by these materials and (2) whether
effects demonstrated by these methods can be modulated experimentally, as predicted by
theory. First, we summarize the various ways categorized lists have been used in the
study of false memory. Next, we discuss the theoretical explanations of why false recall
and false recognition occur for categorized list materials. Last, we describe a series of
three experiments that begin to extend and enhance the methods and understanding of
high confidence false memories.
The Categorized List Procedure
The plethora of studies carried out using the DRM procedure (Deese, 1959;
Roediger & McDermott, 1995) as a tool attest to its wide applicability and theoretical
utility (see Gallo, 2006, 2010, for a review). In this procedure, subjects study a list of
words (e.g., “bed,” “rest,” “awake”) that are semantically associated to a critical lure
word that is never presented (i.e., “sleep”). At test, subjects are highly likely to
incorrectly recognize or recall the critical lure word as being listed, often with high
confidence. The structure of the DRM procedure can be limiting, however, in that only
one critical lure word generally exists per list and that all the studied words are
considered to be similar for purposes of the procedure.
Categorized list methods (e.g., Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Smith et al., 2000)
address some of the limitations of the DRM procedure. These methods tap into natural
categories, which have been shown by the work of Rosch (1973) and others to be integral
to learning, classification, language, and culture (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; see Dry &
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Storms, 2010, for a review). In these experiments, subjects typically study lists of words
comprising different semantic categories such as birds, four-legged animals, or
vegetables (see the Appendix for an example). These categories often contain items that
are common members of the category (e.g., “robin,” “dog,” or “carrot”) as well as items
that are rarer for the category (e.g., “ostrich,” “moose,” or “turnip”). The composition of
these lists is manipulated during the study phase; for instance, the most common category
member might be removed. At test, however, subjects might be highly likely to recall or
recognize that typical category member even though it was not presented (e.g., Smith et
al., 2000). We will discuss these findings in more detail later in this section.
Categorized list materials are usually drawn from a norming study executed by
Battig and Montague (1969) or an updated version by Van Overschelde, Rawson, and
Dunlosky (2004). In the Van Overschelde et al. study, three groups of undergraduates (N
= 600) from geographically diverse universities were recruited. These subjects heard a
category name and were given 30 seconds to type as many members of the category as
possible. The responses were ranked for each category from the most to least frequently
produced member of that category. These categorized lists are deemed to be ordered by
output dominance, such that the most frequently mentioned category members have
higher output dominance than less frequently mentioned category members.1 Responses
that occurred with a frequency of 5% or less were excluded from this rank ordering.
Moreover, as noted in the original Battig and Montague norms, “All legible responses
1

The term used to describe an item’s position in the norms varies from paper to paper, possibly because
this variable is not named in the Van Overschelde et al. (2004) or the original Battig and Montague (1969)
norms. We use output dominance here consistent with the work of Smith and colleagues (2000), but
Dewhurst and colleagues (1999) use the phrase instance frequency to contrast it with traditional printed
frequency. When the categorized lists come from prototype studies as in Rosch (1975), the term typicality
may be appropriate for describing this variable.
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[were] included, even those which are obviously inappropriate to the category name” (p.
3). Thus, the word “spider” could be found on the “insects” list, even though, strictly
speaking, it is not a member of that category.
Categorized lists are a useful tool for examining high confidence false memories
because they offer at least two distinct advantages over other methods: they provide a
greater number of experimental observations per list and permit also allow a high degree
of manipulation of the stimuli. Although false memories evoked by DRM lists
(sometimes called associative lists to contrast them with categorized lists) tend to be
quite strong, each associative list contains only one critical (i.e., unpresented) item. Thus,
many associative lists must be used to collect enough false memory observations.
Moreover, even with a sufficient number of lists (at least 55 DRM lists can be found in
the literature), using this method could be inefficient in certain cases.
A similar problem arises with the more forensically relevant methods, which
generally collect only one observation of interest per subject (e.g., was the perpetrator
correctly identified in the lineup?). The methodological issue here is that these
procedures lead researchers to compute point-biserial coefficients to assess confidenceaccuracy relationships, which can give an incomplete or incorrect picture of the
relationship between these two variables (see Roediger, Wixted, & DeSoto, 2011, for a
review of these issues).
Categorized lists consist of the category name (a superordinate) followed by
subordinates, category members rank-ordered by some measure of category membership.
This structure allows experimental manipulation that is not possible in the methods
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described above. If a categorized list word is removed from the stimulus set to become a
critical item, for instance, the “strength” of the critical item is directly related to its
position in the norms. This also means that more than one item can be removed from a
categorized list at study. The same materials can also be used to compare and contrast
false memories for items of different positions in the norms.
The use of categorized lists to study false memories was pioneered in two lines of
study: one by Smith and colleagues (Smith et al., 2000; Smith, Gerkens, Pierce, & Choi,
2002; Smith, Tindell, Pierce, Gilliland, & Gerkens, 2001) and a second by Dewhurst and
colleagues (Dewhurst, 2001; Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Dewhurst et al., 2009;
Dewhurst & Farrand, 2004). Smith et al. (2000) selected nine categorized lists from
previous research (in this case, Rosch, 1975). Consistent with the DRM procedure, the
item with the highest output dominance — that is, the item that was most frequently
mentioned by subjects in the norming studies — was omitted from each category at
presentation. Subjects studied each list and were given a recall test either just after each
list was studied or after all lists had been presented. For each recall test, a category name
was displayed and subjects recalled as many items as they could from the corresponding
list. Results demonstrated that this category cued recall procedure evoked intrusions of
the omitted (i.e., highest output dominance) item in recall, especially when the recall test
was given after all lists had been presented relative to when the recall test was given after
the presentation of each list. This pattern has also been demonstrated in research with
DRM materials (McDermott, 1996).
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Smith et al. (2000) also noted that the use of categorized lists made it “possible to
systematically observe the effects of gradations in the strength of items from the
category” (p. 389). To demonstrate this observation, the researchers collected their own
norming data for 10 different categories of 30 items each. They then assigned alternating
items to two counterbalancing lists (A and B). Half of subjects studied the ten A lists and
the other half studied the ten B lists. Subjects were cued by category and asked to recall
as many items as possible that were presented from the given category. After subjects
had recalled the items from each of the 10 lists, they were then asked to assign a
confidence rating from 1 (complete guess) to 10 (absolutely certain the response was on
the studied list) for each recalled word.
Results from this experiment showed that items higher in output dominance (i.e.,
the more frequently mentioned items in the norms) were both falsely and correctly
recalled more regularly than items lower in output dominance. No relation between
confidence ratings and intrusions (i.e., false recall) was found. These findings were
further confirmed by several hierarchical multiple regression analyses, leading Smith et
al. (2000) to conclude that false recall is related to output dominance. According to these
researchers, category items that easily come to mind when given a category cue — i.e.,
category items for which there is high conceptual or retrieval fluency (akin to perceptual
fluency; see Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) — are likely to be represented in both false and
correct recall.
The lack of relationship between confidence and false recall in this experiment,
however, is surprising. Smith et al. (2000) theorized, “Neither item accessibility nor
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distinctiveness contribute to one’s confidence that falsely recalled items are accurate” (p.
391). As we shall soon see, the same conclusion cannot be made for the relationship
between confidence and accuracy in recognition memory for categorized list words.
Meade and Roediger (2006, 2009) also used categorized lists in their research.
Instead of omitting only the item with the highest output dominance from each list, the
first five items were removed. Items were presented to subjects list by list and the recall
test was cued by category. The researchers found frequent intrusions of the omitted
words from the studied categories in recall; this outcome occurred with greater frequency
for older than for young adults. Older adults’ poorer performance on this task was
attributed to their greater difficulties in source monitoring (i.e., distinguishing the original
source of a memory). These studies also illustrate the flexibility of categorized lists;
omitting five words per list to serve as critical items would be much more difficult to do
with the DRM procedure.
Another line of research on the categorized list procedure is found in the work of
Dewhurst and colleagues (Dewhurst, 2001; Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Dewhurst et al.,
2009). Dewhurst and Anderson (1999) also compared errors in the categorized list
procedure — which they call the category repetition procedure — to those in the DRM
procedure. They drew on Rajaram’s (1996) distinctiveness-fluency framework, based on
original contributions made by Jacoby (1991), to make predictions about errors in
memory for categorized lists. According to Jacoby, two independent processes operate in
(and support) recognition memory: recollection and familiarity. Recollection is typified
by conscious, controlled processes that rely on attention, whereas familiarity judgments
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are made with little processing effort and are often based on characteristics of perceptual
processing (such as speed). The distinctiveness-fluency framework integrates these
processes, dictating that when the focus of encoding is on the distinctiveness of
individual items, subjects rely more heavily on recollection when responding (i.e., answer
with “remember” responses; see Tulving, 1985); however, when the focus of encoding is
to make the to-be-studied material more fluent (whether perceptually or conceptually),
familiarity-based (i.e., “know”) responses increase. Dewhurst and Anderson proposed
that studying multiple items of semantic categories enhanced the conceptual fluency of
that category, leading to familiarity-based false memory errors: “When a member of a
category was presented at test, activation that resulted from the preceding encounter with
the category enhanced the familiarity” (p. 671). Dewhurst and Anderson also found a
high incidence of false remember responses, however, in line with Roediger and
McDermott (1995). Drawing on similar theories to explain such errors in the DRM
procedure, the researchers suggested that false remember responses were due to errors of
source monitoring (Johnson, 2006; Lindsay, 2008). They argued that subjects implicitly
generated related category members during encoding and then at test erroneously
attributed their recollections to studied words instead of words generated during
encoding.
Dewhurst (2001) further evaluated the implicit generation theory in a second
study. He hypothesized that subjects should be more likely to generate high output
dominance category members relative to lower output dominance category members,
since those members are, after all, more frequently mentioned members of the category in
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the controlled norming studies (e.g., Van Overschelde et al., 2004). To assess this
hypothesis, Dewhurst manipulated output dominance of target and lure items so that half
of the targets and lures were high output dominance items and the other half were low
output dominance targets and lures. Subjects studied six items each from 25 categorized
lists — one high dominance, one low dominance, and four of medium dominance — and
were tested on four items from each category: two high dominance items (one target, one
lure) and two of low dominance (one target, one lure), as well as 50 nonstudied items that
were unrelated to the studied categories. Results showed that subjects made more
“remember” and “know” false alarms to high output dominance lures than low output
dominance lures. (In correct recognition, there were more remember responses to low
frequency items and more know responses to high frequency items.) He concluded that
these findings supported the hypothesis that some false alarms occurring in the category
list procedure resulted from “high degrees of match between lures and nonstudied items
generated at encoding” (p. 157). Other false alarms, as described above, were results of
source memory errors.
One important issue at this juncture is the exact nature of the implicit generation
processes that occur during encoding. Are category members generated intentionally
(overtly) or automatically? If the latter, do items achieve conscious representation or is
activation implicit and unconscious? Are subjects aware that they engage in these
processes? A 2004 study by Dewhurst and Farrand informs some of these topics. In this
study, subjects studied multiple categorized list items and were asked to provide verbal
descriptions for their remember, know, and guess responses for false and correct
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recognition responses. The researchers found that 36% of false remember responses were
given verbal descriptions consistent with associations made or items generated at
encoding. For example, when one subject falsely recognized (and provided a remember
response to) the word “Saturn” when presented earlier with a list of planets, he or she
remarked, “There were other planets on the list — helped me remember it.” Similarly,
another subject falsely recognized the word “cousin,” stating that he or she remembered
“because I saw brother and sister as well” (p. 408).
This introspective evidence is supported by a number of other studies. In his
book on the DRM procedure, Gallo (2010) cites studies by Norman and Schacter (1997),
Huron, Servais, and Danion (2001), and Read (1996) that support the idea of conscious
activation; namely, subjects “might consciously think of the related lure at study and
potentially rehearse this word along with the list words” (p. 81). In sum, evidence
suggests that subjects are aware of this process occurring, but the degree of intentionality
of these processes may vary.
More recently, in an unpublished study, Roediger and DeSoto (2011) extended the
work of Meade and Roediger (2006, 2009) by including confidence judgments in the
categorized list procedure. Subjects studied 15 words from 10 categorized lists (items
ranked 6-20 from sets of items 1-25 in the norms). The five most typical (1-5) and five
least typical (21-25) items from each list were omitted from the study phase; 150 words
in total were studied. Subjects were then given a recognition test over all 250 words from
the 10 studied lists (items 1-25, 15 studied), as well as 50 unrelated words from new
categories. Roediger and DeSoto conducted an item-level analysis and found a weak
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positive association between confidence and accuracy (r = .29) across all items. This
association was revealed to be the result of two subcomponents that differed markedly,
however. A strong positive relationship existed between confidence and accuracy for the
150 studied words (r = .70), but a negative relationship existed for the 50 highly typical
lure words (r = -.54). In the latter case, high confidence was associated with the greatest
false alarm rates (i.e., both false alarms and confidence were higher for items 1-5 in the
norms than for items 21-25). Conversely, subjects rarely false alarmed to items of low
output dominance (21-25), and when these false alarms did occur, subjects were
significantly less confident in them. In summary, subjects tended to be extremely
confident when false alarming to high output dominance items and less confident on low
output dominance items.
When Roediger and DeSoto examined the false alarm rates for items 1-5 across
the different categorized lists, they observed a linear pattern: subjects appeared more
likely to false alarm to item 1 than item 2, more likely to false alarm to 2 than 3, and so
on. This pattern was consistent with earlier findings by Smith et al. (2000) and Dewhurst
(2001) and provided the theoretical basis for the current experiments. To foreshadow, the
pattern observed by Roediger and DeSoto across items 1-5 will also be replicated across
the entire range of output dominance values (i.e., 1-20) in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 of this
thesis. This expanded procedure permits a greater range of items with which to study the
relation between confidence and accuracy.
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Explanations of False Memories in the Categorized List Procedure
What causes false memories for categorized list words? In associative (e.g.,
DRM) lists, the primary culprit is associative strength (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott,
1999; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), especially the associative strength
from list items to the critical item. Associative strength is a measure of associative
relatedness, which is described as “a normative description of the probability that one
word will call to mind a second word” due to contiguity or co-occurrence in the language
(Thompson-Schill, Kurtz, & Gabrieli, 1998, p. 440). Indeed, in DRM lists, the studied
items that converge on the lure are usually strongly related to the lure itself, and the
greater the propensity for list items to be associated to the critical lure, the higher the
false recall or false recognition (Roediger et al., 2001). However, word association
norms suggest that associative strength is not responsible for errors made on the
categorized lists used in the study by Roediger and DeSoto (2011); associative strength is
low from studied items to lures in these materials (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998;
Nunes & DeSoto, raw data). This difference may arise partly because DRM lists consist
of horizontal associates, whereas categorized lists consist of vertical associates (see Park,
Shobe, & Kihlstrom, 2005, for a discussion of the distinction). In other words,
associative list items are all interrelated, but categorized lists feature hierarchical
relationships between the category name and its items (for example, “bird” and
“cardinal”). Thus, associative strength alone fails to explain why high confidence false
alarms occur, which is strong evidence that associative relationships do not drive the high
confidence false alarms seen in the categorized list procedure.
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A second possible explanation of false alarms in the categorized list procedure is
that performance is driven by or related to the word frequency effect, which is the
observation that infrequent words are more regularly recognized than common words
(e.g., Balota & Neely, 1980). Evidence reported in this thesis and elsewhere (e.g., Smith
et al., 2000), however, suggest that false alarms are not entirely explained by frequency in
the language. This consideration will be thoroughly addressed throughout this thesis.
A third explanation is offered by fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005;
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; see Brainerd, Reyna, & Zember, 2011, for more recent work).
This opponent-process account of memory suggests that two kinds of memory traces
drive successful remembering: verbatim and gist. A verbatim trace represents a specific
surface form that is connected and interrelated to other verbatim traces through gist
(meaning-based) traces. According to fuzzy-trace theory, when verbatim traces are
processed, true memories are supported while false memories are suppressed. When gist
traces are processed, though, both true and false memories are supported. It is possible
that studying categorized lists processes gist traces for those materials to a greater extent
than verbatim traces, leading to increased false recognition for lure words that match well
with the gist trace. Such a finding would be supported by Dewhurst’s (2001) observation
that both “know” hits and false alarms were greater for high output dominance category
members than low output dominance category members. Although a fuzzy-trace account
of categorized list errors may seem plausible, little research has been conducted on this
topic (but see Marx & Henderson, 1996).
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Thus, we turn to the more established account as proposed by the research of
Dewhurst and colleagues (Dewhurst, 2001; Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Dewhurst et al.,
2009) and Roediger and DeSoto (2011). When subjects study lists of categorized words,
two things happen: (1) spreading activation occurs, strengthening the representation of
studied and nonstudied items in memory; and (2) subjects may implicitly generate
nonstudied associates of the category. Furthermore, subjects are more likely to generate
high output dominance associates than low output dominance associates (Dewhurst &
Farrand, 2004). At test, subjects are likely to false alarm to nonstudied category items as
a result of either of those two processes enumerated above: (1) due to the summation of
small degrees of match between the test item and nodes activated by prior spreading
activation (e.g., Arndt & Hirshman, 1998; Clark & Gronlund, 1996) or (2) due to a source
monitoring error that the test item was actually presented as opposed to implicitly
generated (thought about) during encoding. Note that although spreading activation
generally occurs via associative networks, some research has shown that it can also occur
for categorized materials (e.g., Pusen, Erickson, Hue, & Vyas, 1988). Meanwhile, source
monitoring errors that cause false recognition result from contextual or episodic
information being associated with the cue. Because the subject mentally generated a
nonstudied category associate, and perhaps even rehearsed it during the study phase,
there is a greater possibility that that category member will be tagged with additional
context, and thus falsely recognized.
According to Dewhurst (2001), spreading activation and source memory errors
are associated with know and remember responses, respectively. Because the
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experiments in this thesis collect confidence ratings instead of remember/know
responses, however, we will be unable to distinguish between these two types of memory
errors. For present purposes, we take Dewhurst’s account to mean that there should be a
greater number of false alarms for higher output dominance category members relative to
lower output dominance category members.
Present Research
If the above account is accurate, we might predict that the patterns demonstrated
in the experiments discussed earlier would hold throughout the range of output
dominance positions. The Dewhurst (2001) study only used one high output dominance
and one low output dominance item from each list, however, and the Roediger and
DeSoto (2011) experiment used only the five highest output dominance items as lures and
did not use those lures as studied items, so it was not possible to evaluate the relationship
between the confidence and accuracy of those items. A fuller assessment of this account
would require examining the response rates throughout the range of the typicality
gradient (Barsalou, 1987) — in other words, the entire range of output dominance values,
as did Smith et al. (2000). Our goal was to combine the general methodology used by
Smith with the theoretical account provided by Dewhurst to better understand recognition
memory in the categorized list procedure.
Thus, the goals of the research underlying this thesis were: First, to test a revised
procedure intended to conceptually replicate Dewhurst (2001), Smith et al. (2000), and
Roediger and DeSoto (2011) and show that false recognition in the categorized list
procedure arises as a function of the output dominance of the lure item across a wider
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range in the norms (items 1-20 versus 1-5). Specifically, subjects were randomly
assigned to study half of the items from different categorized lists of 20 items — either
the even or the odd items. These results are then aggregated across subjects to give both
a correct recognition rate as well as a false recognition rate for each word as well as each
position across all the categorized lists. Second, to use confidence judgments, instead of
remember-know judgments, to investigate metacognitive processes at play during this
task. Confidence is a more typical judgment for most people and is more relevant to
context outside the lab. Third, to further develop a theoretical account of how categorical
false recognition occurs. Fourth, to determine whether these false recognition effects are
explained entirely by the printed frequency of the materials (i.e., the word frequency
effect, e.g., Balota & Neely, 1980). Lastly, in later experiments, we hope to identify
methods to reduce high confidence false alarms in the categorized list procedure. Such
methods relate to the accounts of why errors arise and possibly provide additional support
for these accounts.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 served primarily as a vehicle to revise and improve the categorized
list procedure (which was also used in Experiments 2 and 3 of this thesis). As described
earlier, categorized list methods have previously varied from study to study, so we felt it
important to design a new categorized list procedure that integrates the lines of research
and contributions by both Dewhurst (2001) and Smith et al. (2000). Specifically, we
synthesized Dewhurst’s operationalization of output dominance with Smith’s approach of
assessing performance over a wide range of these values.
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To test this revised categorized list procedure, we evaluated whether it would
replicate earlier work with categorized lists by showing that false and (and perhaps
correct) recognition for category members is a direct function of the output dominance of
those members. In this experiment, subjects studied lists of 10 words (either the even or
odd list positions, counterbalanced across subjects) from 12 categorized lists and were
then given a yes/no recognition test over the (1) studied words, (2) alternate words
(nonstudied words from the same lists that were studied by the subjects in the other
counterbalancing condition), and (3) words from nonstudied categories. After judging
whether each word was old or new, subjects indicated their confidence in the recognition
judgment on a scale from 0-100.
To assess cognitive performance for targets (i.e., studied words) and lures (i.e.,
related and unrelated lures), we the calculated response rates and confidence ratings for
the different item types as well as the effects of output dominance on correct and false
recognition (i.e., hit and false alarm rates). To assess metacognitive performance for
these items, we calculated absolute accuracy (i.e., calibration) and relative accuracy (i.e.,
resolution). Last, we investigated the effects of output dominance on measures of
corrected recognition as measured by two different models.
We predicted, based on theories and prior results by Dewhurst (2001), Smith et al.
(2000), and Roediger and DeSoto (2011), that false recognition would be a declining
function of output dominance; namely, subjects would be more likely to false alarm to
higher output dominance category members relative to lower output dominance
members. We were less certain about the pattern for correct recognition. The standard
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word frequency effect in recognition memory would suggest that an item class that
receives the greatest proportion of correct rejections (i.e., low output dominance items, if
our earlier prediction is correct) should also receive the greatest proportion of hits (i.e.,
the mirror effect, as explained by Glanzer & Adams, 1985). In pilot studies (Roediger &
DeSoto, 2011), however, correct recognition rates did not differ between high output
dominance items (i.e., 1-5 in the norms) and low output dominance items (i.e., 21-25)
even though they differed in frequency. Considering these results, we expected that the
hit rate would not change as a function of output dominance in this task even though the
false alarm rates would (contrary to the findings in the word frequency effect literature).
We also predicted that metacognitive monitoring for studied words would be more
accurate than for related lures, due to the deceptive nature of these items (e.g., their
similarity to studied items). We expected that calibration and resolution would show the
standard pattern as described by Roediger et al. (2011): that confidence and accuracy
would indeed be related for hits (with higher confidence associated with greater
accuracy), but that there would nevertheless be a high likelihood of false recognition,
particularly for related lure items, and that the confidence-accuracy correlation would be
greatly reduced for lures.
Participants
Forty-four students from Washington University in St. Louis participated for
either course credit or payment.
Materials

19

Twelve categorized word lists were selected from the Van Overschelde et al.
(2004) category norms. These were created by asking a large sample of subjects to
generate as many members as possible of a given category (e.g., “a bird”). These
responses were aggregated, producing lists of category items that were ordered from the
most frequently mentioned category member in the first list position (e.g., “eagle” in
Position 1) to the least frequently mentioned category member in the last list position
(e.g., “raven” in Position 20).
The first 20 words from each of the 12 selected categorized lists were used as the
stimulus set. If any words appeared twice in the stimulus set or could be categorized in
two or more of the selected categories (e.g., “squash” is both a vegetable and a sport), the
word was removed from any lists it appeared in and the appropriate twenty-first word
was added, creating a new 20-word list. The 12 lists can be found in the Appendix.
To examine whether output dominance (i.e., list position) was related to word
frequency, a Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated between each word’s output
dominance value (ranging from 1 to 20) and three different measures of word frequency
taken from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007): Kučera and Francis (1967),
HAL (Lund & Burgess, 1996), and log HAL. No significant relationship was found
between output dominance and word frequency as measured by Kučera and Francis,
r(190) = -.102, p = .161. Moreover, only a weak relationship was found between output
dominance and word frequency as measured by HAL, r(234) = -.137, p = .036, as well as
between output dominance and log HAL, r(234) = -.304, p < .001. Thus, although there
is some degree of relation between word frequency and output dominance, the
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relationship is not strong. Because the relation is significant, however, we will partial out
the effects of word frequency when investigating the effects of output dominance on
response rates.
A recording was made of a female speaker reading the words with a Logitech
desktop microphone in tandem with Apple GarageBand software installed on an Apple
MacBook Pro. The speaker read the category name, paused for four seconds, then read
each of the category items in random order at a rate of one word per two seconds. Digital
post-processing was used to eliminate any extraneous sounds from the recording.
Experiments 1 and 2 were programmed in E-Studios E-Prime 2.0 and Experiment
3 was programmed in Adobe Flash CS 4 (Weinstein, 2011) and hosted on a secure
Internet server. Subjects came into the laboratory and were tested on Dell personal
computers running Microsoft Windows XP.
Design
Subjects were assigned randomly to one of two counterbalancing groups. One
group was presented with the odd-numbered words from the first six lists and the evennumbered words from the last six lists. The other group was presented with the alternate
words — the even-numbered words from the first six lists and the odd-numbered words
from the last six lists. The experiment consisted of three phases: (1) the study phase, (2)
the distractor phase, and (3) the recall test phase.
Procedure
During the study phase, each subject heard the audio recording of the female
speaker reciting the category names and items of the 12 lists assigned to the subject’s
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counterbalancing group. For each list, the subject heard the category name (e.g., “a
bird”), followed by a four-second pause, then the corresponding words from that list.
Once the category name and all 10 words were presented, the procedure was repeated
with the remaining lists, in random order. The experiment then continued to the
distractor phase.
During the distractor phase, subjects were given five minutes to list as many of
the United States presidents as possible, then order as many of the presidents as possible.
This task was included to eliminate any contributions to recognition memory
performance from words still in short-term memory.
During the recognition test phase, subjects were given a yes-no recognition test of
360 words, randomly presented (for each subject) one at a time: the 120 studied words
from each of the 12 lists, the 120 related (alternate) lures from the same 12 lists, and 120
unrelated lures taken from 12 new categories. Thus, one-third of items at test were
studied words (targets) and two-thirds were distractors; half of the distractors were
related lures, and the other half of the distractors were unrelated lures. Subjects were not
told about the distribution of the word types at test during the experiment.
Subjects indicated with a mouse click whether they believed each word to be old
(studied) or new (nonstudied). After subjects made this recognition judgment, they
reported confidence by clicking and dragging with the mouse cursor on an on-screen
graphical slider that ranged from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (entirely confident).
The entire experiment lasted about 60 minutes.
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Results
We divided our analyses into three sections: (1) recognition of studied words, (2)
recognition of related and unrelated lures, and (3) effects of output dominance on
measures of corrected recognition (adjusted by taking into account both hit and false
alarm rates). These analyses involved calculating response rates and confidence ratings
and applying hierarchical multiple regression to investigate the effects of output
dominance on hit and false alarm rates. Because we were interested in the effects of
output dominance above and beyond the effects of word frequency, we first eliminated
(i.e., partialed out) the effects of word frequency on response rates in these regression
analyses. We also examined metacognitive performance for studied words and related
and unrelated lures. Although we were most interested in performance for related and
unrelated lures, our report also includes results for studied items in the interest of
providing all the data from our test. The third analysis investigated the effects of output
dominance on corrected recognition (as measured by hits minus false alarms; Macmillan
& Creelman, 2004) and discrimination (as measured by d’).
Recognition of Studied Words
Hit rate and confidence ratings. Hit rate and confidence ratings for hits and
misses were calculated for studied items as basic measures of subjects’ cognitive and
metacognitive performance. These means can be found in the top row of Tables 1 and 2,
respectively. Subjects correctly responded “old” to studied words approximately 75% of
the time (hit rate = .73).
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Table 1
Response rates as a function of word type in Experiment 1.
Hits

Misses

Correct
Rejections

False Alarms

d’

.73 (.19)

.27 (.19)

--

--

--

Related Lures

--

--

.61 (.15)

.39 (.15)

0.89

Unrelated
Lures

--

--

.90 (.12)

.10 (.12)

1.89

Word Type
Studied
Words

Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses.
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Table 2
Confidence as a function of word type and response in Experiment 1.
Word Type

Hits

Misses

Correct
Rejections

False Alarms

Studied Words

82.6 (11.15)

51.1 (16.66)

--

--

Related Lures

--

--

55.8 (16.37)

62.7 (12.83)

Unrelated
Lures

--

--

62.7 (22.36)

52.7 (17.02)

Note. Confidence judgments were made on a 0-100 scale. Standard deviations presented
in parentheses.
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When subjects correctly responded “old,” they were more confident (M = 82.6) than
when they incorrectly responded “new,” (M = 51.1), t(43) = 15.66, p < .001.
Effects of output dominance on the hit rate. To investigate the relationship
between output dominance and hit rate, we used hierarchical multiple regression to
eliminate potentially confounding effects of word (i.e., printed) frequency. These results
can be found in Table 3. Multiple stepwise regression was used to assess the effects of
output dominance on the hit rate while controlling for printed frequency as measured by
log HAL (Hyperspace Analogue to Language; Lund & Burgess, 1996). HAL scores
come from an analysis of 160 million words taken from online newsgroups in the 1990s;
we obtained these values from the English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007). Balota
et al. recommend the use of log HAL as a measure of word frequency because it
successfully controls for words of outlying frequency (i.e., those that are extremely
common or uncommon in the language). Printed frequency was entered into the
regression on its own in the first step, followed by output dominance in the second step.
Printed frequency significantly predicted the hit rate and explained a low but statistically
significant proportion of variance in hit rate, meaning that subjects were more likely to
correctly respond “old” to low frequency words relative to high frequency words. Thus
the usual word frequency effect in hit rates was confirmed. Output dominance was not
shown to predict hit rate beyond printed frequency, however; thus, the position of the
categorized word in the norms (i.e., the output dominance) did not affect the tendency to
correctly call a studied word “old.”
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Table 3
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on hit rate in
Experiment 1.
Variable

B

SE B

β

-.01

.00

-.17*

Printed frequency

-.01

.00

-.20*

Output dominance

-.00

.00

-.10

Step 1
Printed frequency
Step 2

Note. R2 = .03 for Step 1 (p < .05), ΔR2 = .01 for Step 2 (p > .05). *p < .05.
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Metacognitive measures. Depicting the relationship between confidence and
accuracy is a complicated task, and different analyses can often lead to different results
(Roediger et al., 2011). As such, a thorough assessment of metacognitive performance
requires considering the data in multiple ways. We chose to measure subjects’ absolute
and relative accuracy using three methods suggested by Roediger and colleagues. To
measure absolute accuracy, we computed both calibration plots and accuracy plots. To
measure of relative accuracy, we calculated the Goodman-Kruskal gamma (Nelson,
1984).
Absolute accuracy for studied words: Confidence-accuracy correlations. Figure 1
depicts the across-subjects calibration plot for studied words. This plot illustrates each
subject’s hit rate for studied items and average confidence for studied items. The
correlation between these 44 points (one for each subject), computed with a Pearson r,
represents whether subjects that were more confident on average also tended to be more
accurate on average.
Calibration was high, r(42) = .68, p < .001, which means that on average for
studied words, subjects who were more confident were also more likely to be accurate.
As shown by Figure 1, though, two subjects appear to have unusually low hit rates.
When these subjects are removed, the correlation remains high, r(42) = .62, p < .001.
Relative accuracy for studied words: Gamma. Gamma was also calculated for
each subject as a measure of memory resolution, or relative accuracy. This statistic
makes use of the ordinal ranking of subjects’ confidence ratings and accuracy for the
items that were assigned each rating. Gamma correlations, like Pearson correlations,
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Studied Words
1

Hit Rate
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0.25

0
0

25
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100

Confidence
Figure 1. The across-subjects confidence-accuracy plot for studied words in Experiment
1. Each point represents a given subject’s average confidence and hit rate across all
studied words.
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range from -1 to 1; a negative gamma score would indicate that subjects were more
confident on inaccurate than accurate items, a zero gamma indicates no relationship
between a subject’s own confidence and accuracy, and a positive gamma indicates that
subjects were more confident on accurate than inaccurate items.
The gamma correlation was high (M = .73), meaning that subjects tended to assign
higher confidence ratings when correctly responding “old” (hits) compared to incorrectly
responding “new” (misses) to studied words.
In sum, subjects regularly correctly recognized studied words when they were
presented at test. A standard word frequency effect was found: the less common the
studied word was in the lexicon, the more likely a subject was to correctly respond “old”
when it was presented at test. The size of this effect (as measured by variance explained),
however, was small. Metacognitive analyses showed that subjects who were more
confident for studied words were also more likely to recognize these items correctly.
Subjects tended to show accurate metacognitive monitoring for studied words, as well,
mostly assigning higher confidence ratings to those studied words to which they correctly
responded “old.”
Recognition of Related and Unrelated Lures
False alarm rates and confidence ratings. False alarm rates for related and
unrelated lures and confidence ratings can be found in the second and third rows of
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Subjects incorrectly responded “old” to related lures (false
alarm rate or FAR = .39) more often than they incorrectly responded “old” to unrelated
lures (FAR = .10), t(86) = 9.76, p < .001. Turning to confidence ratings, subjects were
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also more confident in their false alarms to related lures (M = 62.7) than to unrelated
lures (M = 52.7), t(39) = 3.17, p = .003. T-tests additionally confirmed that, for related
lures, subjects were more confident for false alarms than for correct rejections (M =
55.8), t(44) = 4.20, p < .001, but this relationship did not exist for related lures; subjects
were no more confident for correct rejections (M = 62.7) than for false alarms, t(39) =
1.71, p = .095. Five subjects were excluded from the analyses involving unrelated lures
because they correctly rejected each of these items.
Effects of output dominance on the false alarm rate. Multiple regression was
used to assess the effects of output dominance on false alarm rate for related lures while
controlling for printed frequency (as measured by log HAL). Unrelated lures were
excluded from this analysis (because they have no output dominance value). These
results can be found in Table 4. Printed frequency significantly predicted false alarm rate
and explained a statistically significant proportion of variance in false alarm rate, such
that subjects were more likely to false alarm to items low in printed frequency. Critically,
however, when output dominance was added to the regression equation, output
dominance was the sole predictor of the false alarm rate. As we predicted, subjects were
more likely to incorrectly respond “old” (i.e., false alarm) to related lures of higher output
dominance than lower output dominance.
Metacognitive measures.
Absolute accuracy for related and unrelated lures: Confidence-accuracy
correlations. Figure 2 depicts the across-subjects calibration plot for related lures and
unrelated lures on the left and right panels, respectively. For related lures, calibration
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Table 4
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on false alarm
rate in Experiment 1.
Variable

B

SE B

β

-.01

.00

-.16*

Printed frequency

.00

.00

.02

Output dominance

-.01

.00

-.45*

Step 1
Printed frequency
Step 2

Note. R2 = .03 for Step 1 (p < .05), ΔR2 = .18 for Step 2 (p < .05). *p < .05.
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Unrelated Lures
Correct Rejection Rate

Correct Rejection Rate

Related Lures
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0

25
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100

Confidence
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0.5
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0
0

25

50

75

100

Confidence

Figure 2. The across-subjects confidence-accuracy plot for related lures (left panel) and
unrelated lures (right panel) in Experiment 1. Each point represents a given subject’s
average confidence and correct rejection rate across all related lures.
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was not significantly different from zero, r(42) = .23, p = .141, which means that there
was no significant relationship between confidence and accuracy for related lures across
subjects. In contrast, for unrelated lures, the relationship between confidence and
accuracy was strong, r(42) = .55, p < .001. Subjects who were more confident when
responding to unrelated lures were also more likely to make correct rejections. Although
a relationship between confidence and accuracy was not found for related lures but was
found for unrelated lures, a direct comparison using the Fisher r-to-z transformation
revealed that the difference between these two correlations was only marginally
significant, p = .082.
Absolute accuracy for related and unrelated words: Accuracy plot. Figure 3
depicts the accuracy plot for related lures and unrelated lures. This curve depicts
subjects’ ability to discriminate between studied words and related lures, as well as
studied words and unrelated lures. For this analysis, as suggested by Roediger et al.
(2011) and Wixted (personal communication, October 14, 2011), we turned the 0 to 100
confidence scale into a -100 to 100 scale such that -100 confidence represented maximum
confidence “new” responses and 100 confidence represented maximum confidence “old”
responses. (Previously, a confidence of 100 could be associated with either an “old” or
“new” response.) We then grouped confidence ratings into 20-point bands (0-19, 20-39,
etc.) and observed the proportion of correct and incorrect responses falling into each
band. On the right half of Figure 3, each point on the related lures line represents the
proportion of hits to studied words falling in that confidence band, divided by the
proportion of hits to studied words for that band plus the proportion of false alarms to
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Figure 3. The accuracy plot for Experiment 1, representing discrimination between
studied words and related lures and discrimination between studied words and unrelated
lures. The dotted line represents expected accuracy; points above this line represent
underconfidence, whereas points below this line represent overconfidence.
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related lures in that band (HR ÷ [HR + FARrelated]). Each point on the unrelated lure line
is calculated similarly: HR ÷ (HR + FARunrelated). On the left half of Figure 3, each point
on the related lures line represents the proportion of correct rejections to related lures
falling in that confidence band, divided by the proportion of correct rejections to related
lures for that band plus the proportion of misses to studied items in that band (CR ÷ [CR
+ MISSrelated]). For unrelated lures, the equation is: CR ÷ (CR + MISSunrelated). Note that
although this plot resembles a traditional calibration curve (e.g., Dunlosky & Metcalfe,
2008), it is not the same, partly because it puts the emphasis on accuracy rather than on
individual word type.
When a perfectly calibrated subject makes a 0 confidence rating, he or she should
have a 50% chance of correctly responding to the recognition prompt. Thus, at 0
confidence on the figure, expected accuracy is 50. This value climbs linearly in either
direction such that expected accuracy when given a confidence rating of -100 or 100 is
100%. The dotted line on Figure 3 represents expected accuracy throughout the
confidence scale. Underconfidence is represented when points deviate above the dotted
line (i.e., subjects are more accurate than their confidence ratings indicate);
overconfidence is shown when points deviate below the dotted line.
Figure 3 shows several important patterns. First, a general relationship between
confidence and accuracy is shown, such that as confidence increases (moving from the
center of the calibration plot to the left or right edges), accuracy does as well. Despite
this general relationship, however, subjects still made a great number of high confidence
errors when discriminating between studied words and related lures; when maximum
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confidence judgments were assigned to an “old” or “new” response, these judgments
were only 80% likely to be correct. Additionally, when discriminating between studied
words and related lures, subjects were less accurate than their confidence judgments
suggested they would have been (i.e., they were overconfident) when they assigned
ratings above 20 when responding “old.”
Relative accuracy for related and unrelated lures: Gamma. For related lures, the
gamma correlation was negative (M = -.21), meaning that a subject was less likely to
correctly reject these items as confidence increased. For unrelated lures, the gamma
correlation was positive (M = .16). A t-test revealed a significant difference between
these two values, t(79) = 6.32, p = .003. The related lure gamma was demonstrated to be
significantly different from zero, t(43) = 4.24, p < .001, but the unrelated lure gamma was
not, t(38) = 1.90, p = .065.
In sum, subjects were likely to falsely recognize related lures. When a false alarm
occurred, it was more likely to be to a word of high output dominance than low output
dominance. For related lures, no relationship between confidence and accuracy was
found, such that subjects who were more confident for related lures were no more likely
to be accurate for them. Further, subjects were more likely to assign higher confidence
ratings when incorrectly responding to related lures than when correctly responding to
them. Within-subjects resolution was also poor; a subject was more likely to false alarm
to a related lure as his or her confidence increased.
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Performance for unrelated lures, in contrast, was generally very strong. Subjects
made very few false alarms to these items and showed accuracy commensurate with their
confidence ratings.
Effects of Output Dominance on Corrected Recognition
Hits Minus False Alarms. One measure of corrected recognition obtained by
subtracting the false alarm rate from the hit rate for each item. Stepwise regression was
used to assess the effects of output dominance on corrected recognition while controlling
for printed frequency (as measured by log HAL). This regression was run across the 240
studied words that served as either studied words or related lures, depending on
counterbalancing group. Thus, unrelated lures were excluded from this analysis because
they had no hit rate or output dominance value. These results can be found in Table 5.
Printed frequency significantly predicted corrected recognition and explained a
statistically significant proportion of variance in corrected recognition. Critically,
however, output dominance did predict corrected recognition above and beyond printed
frequency. These results, taken together, mean that subjects were more accurate for less
common words in the lexicon or words of lower output dominance than more common
words in the lexicon or higher output dominance words.
Discrimination. As a second measure of corrected recognition, we calculated d’
for each item. Multiple regression was used to assess the effects of output dominance on
d’ while controlling for printed frequency (as measured by log HAL). Unrelated lures
were excluded from this analysis because they had no output dominance value. These
results can be found in Table 6. As with hits minus false alarms, printed frequency did
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Table 5
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on corrected
recognition as measured by hits minus false alarms in Experiment 1.
Variable

B

SE B

β

-.01

.00

-.27*

Printed frequency

-.01

.00

-.16*

Output dominance

.01

.00

.37*

Step 1
Printed frequency
Step 2

Note. R2 = .07 for Step 1 (p < .05), ΔR2 = .13 for Step 2 (p < .05). *p < .05.
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Table 6
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on corrected
recognition as measured by discrimination (d’) in Experiment 1.
Variable

B

SE B

β

-.05

.01

-.25*

Printed frequency

-.02

.01

-.12

Output dominance

.02

.00

.43*

Step 1
Printed frequency
Step 2

Note. R2 = .06 for Step 1 (p < .05), ΔR2 = .17 for Step 2 (p < .05). *p < .05.
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significantly predict d’ as well as a significant proportion of variance in d’. However,
when output dominance was added in the second step, it served as the only significant
predictor of d’. These results indicate that subjects showed better discrimination for
items of low output dominance than items of high output dominance.
Discussion
The main finding of Experiment 1 was that subjects were more likely to false
alarm to high output dominance categorized list items than low output dominance items
in a
regular fashion across the first 20 items in the category norms. Experiment 1 also
revealed that subjects had relatively poor metacognitive awareness when responding to
nonstudied categorized list items from studied categories, which was demonstrated by
the observation that related lures were the only class of items in which confidence for
false alarms exceeded confidence for correct rejections. Related lures also showed poor
calibration (especially for high confidence ratings) and negative resolution.
As hypothesized, these results corroborate previous accounts of how errors arise
in the categorized list procedure. When subjects study interpolated items from different
categorized lists, they may implicitly generate other items from the same category that
were never studied (Dewhurst & Farrand, 2004). An item’s likelihood of being implicitly
generated is closely linked to its output dominance, or position, in the category norms. At
test, it is hypothesized that subjects are more likely to false alarm to items of higher
output dominance, since these items were more likely to be generated at encoding. These
false alarms are likely to be the ones that occur with high confidence because they
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represent source monitoring errors and are also likely associated with remember
responses in similar remember/know experiments (e.g., Dewhurst, 2001). In addition,
other false alarms may result from spreading activation, or the summing of small degrees
of match between other studied items and the item at test (Arndt & Hirshman, 1998).
These spreading activation false alarms most likely occur with lower confidence or know
responses. As such, we recognize that different qualitative bases of responding might
have contributed to the errors that occurred in Experiment 1. Because we collected
confidence ratings instead of remember/know judgments, however, we cannot
differentiate between these bases of responding in the current experiment.
As mentioned in the Introduction, associative strength does not seem to be driving
these false alarms, given the lack of associative strength between studied items and the
critical lures in categorized lists (Nelson et al., 1998; Nunes & DeSoto, raw data).
Dewhurst et al. (2009) further supported this conclusion by reporting associative strength
in their experiments; mean associative strength between lures and studied items in DRM
lists taken from Stadler et al. (1999) was moderate (M = .17), but it was low (M = .03)
between lures and studied items in categorized list materials taken from Van Overschelde
et al. (2004). Smith et al. were led by the data from a free association experiment to
report similarly:
“Critical words from associatively structured lists were given as responses in the
free association task at a very high rate… critical words from categorically
structured lists, however… evoked critical items at a rate of less than one-tenth
that found for the associatively structured list words.” (p. 339)
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The fact that associative strength is low for categorical materials weakens
Dewhurst’s (2001) theory that high output dominance category members are generated at
encoding, however, and it is unclear that this theoretical mechanism explains how high
confidence false memories occur. Partly for this reason, it still seems appropriate to
consider alternative explanations for our findings. A fuzzy-trace theory account, as
discussed earlier, might also account for these data. Fuzzy-trace theory posits that
processing verbatim traces increases true and decreases false memories, whereas
processing gist traces increases both true and false memories. It is possible that the
higher output dominance category items are afforded additional gist processing due to
their overall similarity with the category prototype, whereas lower output dominance
category items are targeted by additional verbatim processing, possibly because of their
distinctiveness. Put another way, a subject trying to memorize a list of birds might be
more likely to process individual item information for low output dominance item but
focus more on a high dominance item’s relation to the bird category or its prototype.
This initial account would explain why a greater number of false memories arise for high
output dominance category members than low output dominance category members.
Nevertheless, one important conceptual issue here is whether the experimental
results reported are manifestations of two other well-known effects in recognition
memory: the word frequency effect and the mirror effect. The word frequency effect is
the finding that recognition performance is better for low frequency words than high
frequency words (Balota & Neely, 1980). The mirror effect is the related observation that
the classes of items for which “new” responses are most accurate are also the class of
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items for which “old” responses are most accurate (Glanzer & Adams, 1985). For
example, in recognition, studied low frequency words are distinctive and may “pop out”
when they appear at test, improving the hit rate. Similarly, when such distinctive words
appear at test but were not studied, the lack of familiarity or episodic context also
improves the correct rejection rate (i.e., subjects feel they would have remembered the
word had it been presented). Thus, both “old” and “new” responses are more accurate for
low frequency words as compared to high frequency words.
In Experiment 1, we used hierarchical regression to factor out the effects of word
frequency and determined that output dominance affects false recognition above and
beyond word frequency. In addition to this finding, two additional lines of evidence
suggest that the conclusions reported in Experiment 1 are not explained entirely by word
frequency: (1) the mirror effect is not present in the reported recognition data; and (2)
other empirical studies have controlled for word frequency while varying output
dominance and shown similar effects to the ones reported.
A first reason output dominance appears to have a different effect than word
frequency on false recognition is the lack of a mirror effect in the dataset. The mirror
effect is that in recognition memory, low frequency words should enjoy a greater number
of hits and correct rejections than high frequency words. Our data show that the correct
rejection rate (i.e., the inverse of false alarm rate) is higher for low output dominance
items than high output dominance items. Critically, however, the hit rate was the same
over the entire range of output dominance, contradicting the mirror effect pattern.
Although the mirror effect is a common finding in recognition memory, Greene (2007)
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argued that the mirror effect is not a law of memory, and our findings support that claim.
They show that the relationship between response rate for hits, false alarms, and output
dominance cannot be attributed to word frequency, suggesting some other mechanism is
at play.
Last, other empirical research suggests that the effects of output dominance are
separable from the effects of word frequency. In the paper by Dewhurst (2001), printed
frequency (i.e., word frequency as measured by Kučera and Francis, 1967) was kept
constant while output dominance of lure items varied. Nevertheless, Dewhurst still found
results consistent with those reported here — that more false alarm remember responses
were made for high output dominance items than low output dominance items. These
results led Dewhurst to conclude, “In the present study, high and low [output dominance]
items were matched for printed frequency. The present findings therefore show that
instance frequency exerts an effect in recognition memory over and above that of printed
frequency” (p. 159).
Although word frequency does not seem to describe entirely the Experiment 1
data, it is important to consider the possibility that some of these results may be due to
differential processing allotted to distinctive, low output dominance category members.
Across four experiments, Jacoby, Craik, and Begg (1979) observed that distinctiveness of
an item led to superior memory for it on a later test. The results of Experiment 1 do not
show improved recognition for studied items of low output dominance relative to high
output dominance, however. Explaining this finding (i.e., the lack of the mirror effect)
will be an important pursuit for future research; one tentative hypothesis could be that the
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powerful influence of output dominance offsets the effects of distinctiveness of the list
items.
Experiment 2
Subjects are thought to commit false alarms in the categorized list procedure
because they encode related (nonstudied) category members and thus incorrectly judge at
test that these items were studied. Are there any experimental manipulations that can
reduce or otherwise affect the likelihood that subjects make these source monitoring
errors? One explanation of why subjects are so likely to accept related category members
as “old” is offered by fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Reyna & Brainerd,
1995). When subjects study categorized lists, they process both the gist as well as the
verbatim traces of the materials. For instance, when subjects study the “birds” list, they
extract and process both the individual items in the list as well as a more general sense of
“birdness.” At test, subjects engage in differing amounts of gist and verbatim processing
to make recognition decisions.
In Experiment 1, subjects were highly likely to accept high output dominance
members that were not studied as “old.” One possible explanation for this, consistent
with fuzzy-trace theory, is that the composition of the test induced subjects to rely on gist
processing over verbatim processing to make recognition decisions. Because half of the
lures in Experiment 1 were from unrelated categories, subjects may have made
recognition decisions based on gist for words from studied categories (i.e., 67% of all test
items were related to the 12 categories and only 33% were unrelated). Thus, subjects

46

might have been making recognition judgments using the heuristic “was this item related
to the ones I saw?”
If recognition judgments were made in this way, subjects might have compared
each item on the test to the gist-based representation extracted during encoding, and
higher output dominance category members might have been better matches to this
representation than lower output dominance category members. Because fuzzy-trace
theory predicts that processing gist information increases both correct and false
recognition, subjects might have been more likely to incorrectly respond “old” to higher
output dominance category members than lower output dominance members — a result
shown for false alarms in our data.
To test this possibility, we conducted a second experiment with the same materials
as in Experiment 1, but with all unrelated lure words omitted during the test. Thus,
subjects were given the task of discriminating between 120 studied words (10 each from
12 categories) and 120 lure words from the same categories. By omitting the unrelated
lures, we expected that subjects might be less likely to use gist processing (i.e., a global
similarity heuristic) and that they would be encouraged to rely more heavily on verbatim
or controlled processing to make recognition decisions. Changing conditions at test
should not affect the implicit generation of related category members at encoding
(according to Dewhurst’s theory), however, assuming this process occurs.
Thus, if the format of the test list in Experiment 1 lead subjects to make
recognition decisions based on gist rather than verbatim information, eliminating
unrelated distractors from the list should emphasize verbatim processing to a greater
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degree, eliminating or at least attenuating the relationship between output dominance and
false alarm rate. If implicit generation of category members occurs during encoding,
however, subjects should still false alarm to high output dominance category members.
This is because subjects will have source memory errors for the generated items at test
regardless of the composition of the test list.
Although Experiment 2 is not a direct test of these two hypotheses, as they are not
mutually exclusive, it should provide an opportunity to investigate the nature of the
processing that occurs during the categorized list procedure. Additionally, because
Experiment 2 is very similar to Experiment 1 — it employs the same pool of subjects, the
same stimuli, and the same procedure — it enables us to do a cross-experiment
comparison (albeit with some caution).
Participants
Twenty-eight students from Washington University in St. Louis participated for
either course credit or payment.
Materials
Experiment 2 used the same materials used in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The study, distractor, and recognition test phases in Experiment 2 were identical
to the phases in Experiment 1, except for one change: the 120 unrelated words taken from
new categories were omitted from the final test. Thus, the recognition test consisted of
240 words: the 120 studied words and the 120 related lures from the studied lists. As a
result, half of the test items were targets and half were distractors. Subjects were not told
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of the composition of test items. We expected that omission of unrelated lures would
reduce false alarm rates relative to Experiment 1 but would not affect the negative
relationship between output dominance and false alarm rate.
Results
As with Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2 are presented in three sections:
(1) recognition of studied words, (2) recognition of related lures, and (3) effects of output
dominance on corrected recognition.
Recognition of Studied Words
Hit rate and confidence ratings. Hit rate and confidence ratings can be found in
the top row of Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Subjects correctly responded “old” to studied
words approximately three-quarters of the time (hit rate = .70). When subjects correctly
responded “old,” they were more confident (M = 84.2) than when they incorrectly
responded “new,” (M = 48.5), t(25) = 18.65, p < .001.
Effects of output dominance on the hit rate. A multiple hierarchical regression
analysis was used to assess the effects of output dominance on the hit rate while
controlling for printed frequency as measured by log HAL. The results can be found in
Table 9. Printed frequency did not explain a significant amount of variance in hit rate.
When output dominance was added to the regression equation, however, it did
significantly predict hit rate such that subjects were more likely to correctly respond
“old” to items of higher output dominance than lower output dominance.
Metacognitive measures.
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Table 7
Response rates as a function of word type in Experiment 2.
Word Type
Studied
Words
Related Lures

Hits

Misses

Correct
Rejections

False Alarms

d’

.70 (.12)

.30 (.12)

--

--

--

--

--

.72 (.13)

.28 (.13)

1.10

Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses.
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Table 8
Confidence as a function of word type and response in Experiment 2.
Word Type

Hits

Misses

Correct
Rejections

False Alarms

Studied Words

84.2 (9.47)

48.5 (12.87)

--

--

Related Lures

--

--

59.9 (13.62)

55.1 (12.77)

Note. Confidence judgments were made on a 0-100 scale. Standard deviations presented
in parentheses.
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Table 9
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on hit rate in
Experiment 2.
Variable

B

SE B

β

.00

.00

.04

Printed frequency

.00

.00

-.01

Output dominance

.00

.00

-.18*

Step 1
Printed frequency
Step 2

Note. R2 = .00 for Step 1 (p > .05), ΔR2 = .03 for Step 2 (p < .05). *p < .05.
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Absolute accuracy for studied words: Confidence-accuracy correlations. Figure
4 depicts the across-subjects calibration plot for studied words. The correlation was high,
r(26) = .71, p < .001, which means that on average for studied words, subjects who were
more confident were also more likely to be accurate.
Relative accuracy for studied words: Gamma. The gamma correlation was high
(M = .79), meaning that subjects tended to assign higher confidence ratings when
correctly responding “old” (hits) compared to incorrectly responding “new” (misses) to
studied words.
In sum, subjects were highly likely to correctly respond “old” when presented with
a studied item on the recognition test. Items of higher output dominance were more
likely to be correctly responded to than items of lower output dominance — a finding
inconsistent with the word frequency effect. Subjects who were more confident in
responding to studied items were also more likely to be accurate, as shown by both
calibration and resolution measures.
Recognition of Related Lures
False alarm rates and confidence ratings. False alarm rates for related lures and
confidence ratings can be found in the second and third rows of Tables 7 and 8,
respectively. Subjects incorrectly responded “old” to related lures almost two-fifths of
the time (FAR = .39). They were similarly confident for false alarms (M = 55.1) and
correct rejections (M = 59.9), t(25) = 1.69, p = .103.
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Figure 4. The across-subjects confidence-accuracy plot for studied words in Experiment
2. Each point represents a given subject’s average confidence and hit rate across all
studied words.
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Table 10
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on false alarm
rate in Experiment 2.
Variable

B

SE B

β

.01

.00

.11

Printed frequency

.00

.00

-.03

Output dominance

-.01

.01

-.45*

Step 1
Printed frequency
Step 2

Note. R2 = .01 for Step 1 (p > .05), ΔR2 = .19 for Step 2 (p < .05). *p < .05.
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Effects of output dominance on the false alarm rate. Multiple regression was
used to assess the effects of output dominance on the false alarm rate for related lures
while controlling for printed frequency (as measured by log HAL). These results can be
found in Table 10. Printed frequency neither predicted false alarm rate nor explained a
statistically significant proportion of variance in the false alarm rate. When output
dominance was added to the regression equation, however, output dominance
significantly predicted the false alarm rate.
Subjects were more likely to incorrectly respond “old” (i.e., false alarm) to related
lures of higher output dominance than lower output dominance.
Metacognitive measures.
Absolute accuracy for related lures: Confidence-accuracy correlations. Figure 5
depicts the across-subjects calibration plot for related lures. For these items, the
correlation was not significantly different from zero, r(26) = .28, p = .169, which means
that there was not a significant relationship between confidence and accuracy for related
lures across subjects.
Absolute accuracy for related lures: Accuracy plot. Figure 6 depicts the accuracy
plot for related lures, which depicts subjects’ ability to discriminate between studied
words and related lures at test. Responses of “new” or “old” that were made with higher
accuracy were indeed more likely to be correct, but some errors were still made when a
confidence rating of 100 was assigned to a recognition decision. In particular, subjects
were less accurate than their confidence ratings would have predicted when they
responded “old” with mid-range (20-80) confidence.
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Figure 5. The across-subjects confidence-accuracy plot for related lures in Experiment
2. Each point represents a given subject’s average confidence and correct rejection rate
across all related lures.
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Figure 6. The accuracy plot for Experiment 2, depicting subjects’ ability to discriminate
between studied words and related lures. The dotted line represents expected accuracy;
points above this line represent underconfidence, whereas points below this line represent
overconfidence.
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Relative accuracy for related lures: Gamma. The gamma correlation was negative (M =
-.13), meaning that a given subject was less likely to assign higher confidence ratings
when correctly rejecting responding “new” (as compared to incorrectly responding
“old”).
In sum, subjects were likely to false alarm to related lures and did so more often for
higher output dominance category members than for lower output dominance members.
Subjects who were more confident when responding to related lures were no more or less
accurate for that item type, and were generally less accurate than they believed they were
when responding “old.”
Effects of Output Dominance on Corrected Recognition
Because the corrected recognition and discrimination results were so similar in
Experiment 1, we only report the hits minus false alarms data here. Stepwise regression
was used to assess the effects of output dominance on corrected recognition while
controlling for printed frequency (as measured by log HAL). The results can be found in
Table 11. Printed frequency neither significantly predicted corrected recognition nor
explained a statistically significant proportion of variance in corrected recognition. When
output dominance was added to the regression equation, however, only output dominance
was related to corrected recognition such that subjects were more accurate overall for
words of lower output dominance than higher output dominance.
Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2
Because Experiments 1 and 2 used subjects from the same population and tested
over a very similar set of materials, we believe it useful to present a brief comparison of
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Table 11
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on corrected
recognition as measured by hits minus false alarms in Experiment 2.
Variable

B

SE B

β

.00

.00

-.06

Printed frequency

.00

.00

.01

Output dominance

.00

.00

.25*

Step 1
Printed frequency
Step 2

Note. R2 = .00 for Step 1 (p > .05), ΔR2 = .06 for Step 2 (p < .05). *p < .05.
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Experiments 1 and 2. A comparison of response rates, confidence ratings, confidenceaccuracy correlations, and gamma correlations can be found in Table 12. As this table
shows, hit rate in Experiment 2 (M = .73) did not differ from hit rate in Experiment 1 (M
= .70), t(68) = .59, p = .555. In Experiment 1, no relationship was found between output
dominance and hit rate. Experiment 2, however, an effect was found such that subjects
were more likely to correctly respond “old” to items of higher output dominance. This
finding may imply that subjects invoked a greater degree of recollective processing when
they encountered high output dominance items. Experiments 1 and 2 also showed similar
absolute accuracy (as demonstrated by similar confidence-accuracy plots and accuracy
plots) and similar relative accuracy (as demonstrated by gamma correlations). Moreover,
a comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 does show that eliminating unrelated lures at test
did reduce the false alarm rate — subjects were much more likely to false alarm to related
lures in Experiment 1 (M = .39) compared to Experiment 2 (M = .28), t(68) = 2.90, p = .
005. The regression analyses between Experiments 1 and 2, however, were similar —
output dominance was a significant predictor of false alarm rate regardless of whether
unrelated lures were present on the recognition test. Subjects exhibited similar absolute
accuracy and relative accuracy for related lures in both experiments.
Further, when looking at corrected recognition, regression showed that output
dominance predicted recognition performance in both Experiments 1 and 2. Overall,
performance was best for lower output dominance items than higher output dominance
items. In sum, removing unrelated distractors from test reduced the overall false alarm
rate and marginally improved metacognitive monitoring. Subjects were likely to false
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Table 12
Comparison of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 response rates and confidence ratings.
False alarm response proportions and confidence ratings are calculated for related lures.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Difference
Response
Proportions
Hits

.73

.70

.03

False Alarms

.39

.28

.11

Hits

82.6

84.3

-1.7

Misses

50.1

48.5

1.7

False Alarms

62.7

59.9

2.8

55.8

55.1

0.7

Hits

.68

.71

-.03

False Alarms

.23

.28

-.06

Hits

.73

.79

-.06

False Alarms

-.21

-.13

.07

Confidence

Correct
Rejections
ConfidenceAccuracy
Correlations

Gamma
Correlations

62

alarm to high output dominance related lures regardless of whether unrelated lures were
present at test, however.
Discussion
The main finding of Experiment 2 was that subjects were more likely to falsely
recognize (i.e., false alarm to) and to correctly recognize (i.e., hit) higher output
dominance items. The comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrates that removing
unrelated lure words from the test in the categorized list procedure does not affect the
relationship between output dominance and false alarms. Removing unrelated distractors
reduced the false alarm rate by 39% relative to the original rate. Although there were
fewer false alarms overall in Experiment 2 relative to Experiment 1, the fact that a
negative relationship continued to exist between output dominance and false alarms
indicates that subjects still generated associates of the studied categories at encoding. As
high confidence false recognition is thought by Dewhurst (2001) to stem from source
monitoring errors resulting from nonstudied associates being generated at encoding, the
persistence of this negative relationship in both Experiments 1 and 2 suggests this process
is still occurring. These findings are consistent with the research of Dewhurst et al.
(2009), which concluded that false alarms to categorized list words are a function of
associations made at encoding and not at retrieval; in other words, the composition of the
test list does not much affect the relationship between output dominance and the false
alarm rate.
Although removing unrelated lures from test did not disrupt the linear relationship
between false alarm rate and output dominance, it did reduce the overall false alarm rate.
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One explanation for this reduction is that when these items are eliminated, subjects are
motivated to invoke recollective processing to a greater degree than they were in
Experiment 1, because all items appearing on test are similar (i.e., came from studied
categories and had the same superordinates). This controlled type of processing
(recollection) is less error-prone. Similarly, a fuzzy-trace explanation might argue that
removing unrelated distractors reduces the degree to which subjects process gist at test,
also reducing false alarm rate for nonstudied categorized items. Either of these
explanations would still be compatible with Dewhurst’s implicit generation theory; in
fact, it is possible that Experiment 2 also serves as a first step toward distinguishing these
two possible influences (i.e., gist or activation and source monitoring) on false
recognition.
Taken together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with the
previously established account of false alarms in the categorized list procedure as set
forth by Dewhurst (2001). Subjects studied lists of category items and likely generate
other items of those studied categories. At test, subjects likely experienced source
monitoring errors, regardless of the composition of the test list. These errors lead
subjects to falsely recognize nonstudied category members items, with errors being more
likely for high output dominance lures. We hypothesized that removing unrelated
distractors from test would make subjects less likely to use a global similarity heuristic
(or gist processing). Although this may have occurred, the findings of Experiment 2
suggest that eliminating unrelated distractors did not make subjects less likely to confirm
high output dominance lures as studied.
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Experiment 3
Experiment 3 targeted processes occurring at encoding and at test. This
experiment was inspired by Benjamin (2001), who investigated the effects of study
repetition on recognition memory. In the first experiment of his article, Benjamin
presented young and older adults with 10 DRM lists. Five of the DRM lists were
presented once; the other five lists were presented to subjects three consecutive times.
Benjamin found that presenting a list three times increased feelings of familiarity both for
the items that were repeated as well as their corresponding lures for all subjects, but he
also found that younger adults exhibited an ability to counter false familiarity for
nonstudied associates through an increased reliance on recollection. Thus, as a result of
repetition, both young and older adults showed improved correct recognition, but older
adults suffered from additional false alarms (because of their weaker ability to counter
false familiarity). For young adults, the tendency to false alarm decreased with repetition
of the list.
The patterns described by Benjamin are also supported in the literature on
associative recognition (e.g., Buchler, Faunce, Light, Gottfredson, & Reder, 2011; Light,
Patterson, Chung, & Healy, 2004) and feature and conjunction errors (e.g., Jones, Jacoby,
& Gellis, 2001; Reinitz, Verfaellie, & Milberg, 1996). In associative recognition
experiments, subjects study pairs of words (e.g., “sailor - anchor”) and are later given a
recognition test on several different classes of items: (1) intact pairs of words in the same
configuration as they were studied (“sailor - anchor” or “village - park”), (2) rearranged
pairs (“sailor - park”), (3) new-old or old-new pairs (“anchor - grease”), and (4) new-new
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pairs (“bacon - grease”). The subsequent recognition test can vary; sometimes, subjects
respond only “old” or “new” based on whether a presented pair was an exact copy of a
studied pair, but more recent techniques (e.g., as seen in Buchler et al., 2011) have
subjects choose one of multiple responses (“old-old,” “old-new,” etc.).
Associative recognition procedures are often used in concert with repetition to
dissociate the effects of familiarity and recollection on recognition memory. When a
given word pair is repeated, both familiarity and recollection are improved for that pair.
When a rearranged pair is presented at test, however, familiarity of the two words is high.
Subjects must use controlled recollective processes to discriminate between studied pairs
and lure pairs that contain one or two words that were actually studied during the
experiment. Light and colleagues (2004) presented young and older adults with unrelated
word pairs, half presented once and half presented four times. They found, similar to
Benjamin (2001), that both groups exhibited an improved hit rate as a result of repetition.
Older adults also showed an increased false alarm rate for rearranged pairs, however,
whereas young adults showed either no change or a decrease in false alarm rate. The
explanation provided by Light et al. was similar to that of Benjamin’s: familiarity was
increased for both groups of subjects as a result of repetition, but young adults were able
to draw on recollective processes to avoid making false alarms to rearranged pairs. Older
adults, who have been shown to have a decreased ability to use recollection, were less
able to draw on this type of processing and thus made more false alarms to pairs that
were familiar but not in their intact form.
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Experiment 3 was designed to determine if repeated experience with categorized
lists would change the relationship between output dominance and false alarm rates
relative to Experiments 1 and 2. This third experiment used the basic method of
Experiment 1 (120 studied words, 240 lures) but included three experimental conditions:
study once and test, as in Experiment 1; study twice and then test, similar to Benjamin
(2001), and study once, test with feedback, then study and test second time — a new
condition featuring three presentations of the material. Note that all subjects received one
final test, but the subjects in the third condition received a test twice. Both study and test
phases were expected to increase familiarity for studied words, because tests were also
predicted to increase familiarity for lures (because subjects saw them during the test).
The beneficial effects of testing with feedback were also predicted to increase
recollection for studied words, however. Studying twice relative to once was predicted to
lead the young adults to reduce their false alarm rates (due to greater reliance on
recollection and less on familiarity); including feedback after the first test was also
predicted to reduce false alarm rates even further for the same reasons.
Participants
Sixty students from Washington University in St. Louis participated for either
course credit or payment.
Design
This study used a 2 (counterbalancing group) x 3 (experimental condition)
between-subjects design. One group of subjects was presented with the odd-numbered
words from the first six lists and the even-numbered words from the last six lists. The
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other group was presented with the alternate words — the even-numbered words from the
first six lists and the odd-numbered words from the last six lists. After the study phase,
subjects from both counterbalancing groups were then assigned randomly to one of three
experimental conditions. Subjects in the ST condition (S representing study and T
representing test) studied the 120 word list and took a recognition memory test (360
items) and made confidence ratings, as in Experiment 1. Subjects in the SST condition,
however, studied and then immediately restudied the same materials, then took the
recognition memory test and made confidence ratings. Subjects in the STST condition
studied the 120 words, took a recognition memory test, made confidence ratings and,
critically, received feedback (a screen displaying “correct” or “incorrect”) after each
rating. These subjects then restudied the materials and took a final test (without
feedback) in the same manner as those in the ST and SST conditions. An illustration of
these different experimental conditions can be found in Figure 7. Note that the final
criterial test occurred immediately after the last list presentation across the three
conditions, albeit after the only list presentation in the ST condition and after the second
presentation for the SST and STST conditions.
Thus, ST was a replication of Experiment 1, SST applied the method used by
Benjamin (2001), and STST added a test with feedback between the study repetitions
used in SST. Note that although Benjamin presented each DRM list three times in a row,
this experiment presented the 12 categories once in their entirety before repeating them
(i.e., in two separate blocks). Spacing the material in this fashion was thought to provide
subjects with greater temporal discrimination, making it easier to invoke more controlled
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CONDITION 1 - ST
study once

S

D

T

CONDITION 2 - SST
study repetition

S

D

S

D

T

CONDITION 3 - STST
study-test repetition
with feedback

S

D

TFB

D

S

D

T

Figure 7. A pictorial representation of the three experimental conditions in Experiment 3.
S = study phase, D = distractor phase, TFB = test with feedback phase, T = test phase.
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processing on the final test. This alteration also allowed insertion of the intermediate test
unique to the STST condition.
The entire experiment took 45 minutes (for subjects in the ST condition) to 90
minutes (for those in the STST condition).
Procedure
During each study phase, subjects were presented with 120 items in the same
manner as in the prior experiments. The category name was presented over headphones,
followed by a four second pause; then, each category item was presented at a rate of one
word per two seconds. This procedure was repeated for each of the 11 remaining lists of
the stimulus set.
During each distractor phase, subjects were randomly asked to list as many
United States presidents as possible, as many United States cities as possible, or as many
of the 50 United States as possible. In the SST and STST conditions, where subjects
completed more than one distractor task, no subject was assigned the same distractor task
twice.
During each test phase, subjects made yes-no (i.e., old or new) recognition
judgments on the 360 items, randomly presented, as in Experiment 1. Following each
recognition judgment, subjects rated their confidence on a 0 (not at all confident) to 100
(entirely confident) sliding scale. The experiment then continued on to the next word.
During the intermediate test in the STST condition only, an on-screen feedback message
was displayed for 1.5 seconds after each confidence rating indicating whether the
recognition judgment was correct or incorrect.
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As illustrated by Figure 7,

subjects in the ST

CONDITION 1 - ST
study once

S

D

T

CONDITION 2 - SST
study repetition

S

D
five-

S

D

T

CONDITION 3 - STST
study-test repetition
with feedback

S

D

TFB

D

S

condition studied the materials,
completed a

D

T

minute
distractor task, then took the recognition test. Subjects in the SST condition studied all
the materials once, completed a five-minute distractor task, restudied the materials again,
in a different random order, completed a second distractor task, and then took the
recognition test. Subjects in the STST condition studied, completed a five-minute
distractor task, took an intermediate recognition test with feedback (as described above),
completed a second distractor task, studied the materials again, completed a third
distractor task, and then took the final recognition test.
Results
In our analysis of Experiment 3, we focused primarily on investigating performance
for studied items and related lures across the three conditions. We do not emphasize
responses to unrelated lures because performance for this item type was high; only rarely
did subjects false alarm to these items. As the ST condition in Experiment 3 was an exact
replication of Experiment 1, we first compared the results of both experiments to ensure
there were no notable performance differences between groups of subjects. As expected,
this was the case (FARE3 = .37 vs. FARE1 = .39, etc.)
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Recognition of Studied Words
Hit rate and confidence ratings. Hit rate and confidence ratings can be found in
Tables 13 and 14, respectively. A one-way ANOVA failed to find an effect of condition
on the hit rate, F(2, 57) = 1.47, p = .238. Two more one-way ANOVAs failed to find an
effect of condition on confidence for hits, F(2, 57) = .13, p = .882, or an effect of
condition on confidence for misses, F(2, 56) = 2.42, p = .098. However, this last
Table 13
Response rates as a function of word type in Experiment 3.
Item Type
Studied
Words
Condition 1 Related
(ST)
Lures
Unrelated
Lures
Studied
Words
Condition 2 Related
(SST)
Lures
Unrelated
Lures
Studied
Words
Condition 3 Related
(STST) Lures
Unrelated
Lures

Correct
False Alarm
Rejection

Hit

Miss

.75 (.17)

.25 (.17)

--

--

--

--

--

.63 (.22)

.37 (.22)

1.00

--

--

.91 (.07)

.09 (.07)

2.01

.82 (.14)

.18 (.14)

--

--

--

--

--

.70 (.16)

.30 (.16)

1.44

--

--

.94 (.07)

.06 (.07)

2.47

.71 (.27)

.29 (.27)

--

--

--

--

--

.86 (.12)

.14 (.12)

1.63

--

--

.99 (.02)

.01 (.02)

2.88

Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses.
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Table 14
Confidence as a function of word type in Experiment 3.
Item Type
Studied
Words
Condition 1 Related
(ST)
Lures
Unrelated
Lures
Studied
Words
Condition 2 Related
(SST) Lures
Unrelated
Lures
Studied
Words
Condition 3 Related
(STST) Lures
Unrelated
Lures

Hit

Miss

84.5 (11.75) 55.3 (14.31)

Correct
Rejection

False Alarm

--

--

--

--

64.3 (14.35)

61.4 (13.16)

--

--

72.7 (16.66)

43.0 (18.98)

--

--

86.2 (9.20) 45.3 (21.17)
--

--

63.9 (18.14)

51.1 (14.02)

--

--

78.0 (18.36)

29.1 (22.36)

--

--

85.3 (11.76) 44.3 (15.85)
--

--

71.3 (14.29)

54.1 (15.05)

--

--

86.2 (15.26)

51.6 (30.95)

Note. Confidence judgments were made on a 0-100 scale. Standard deviations presented
in parentheses.
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relationship did appear to approach significance, however, and was likely driven by a
marginally significant difference between the ST and STST conditions, p = .053.
Effects of output dominance on the hit rate. Multiple stepwise regression was
used to assess the effects of output dominance on the hit rate while controlling for printed
frequency as measured by log HAL. The regression results can be found in Table 15. In
the ST condition, printed frequency did not significantly predict hit rate, but when output
dominance was added to the regression equation, it predicted a significant amount of
variance such that subjects were more likely to correctly respond “old” to high output
dominance items. Neither printed frequency nor output dominance explained any
variance in hit rate in either the SST or STST conditions, however.
Metacognitive measures.
Absolute accuracy for studied words: Confidence-accuracy correlations. Table
16 depicts the across-subjects calibration correlations for studied words. The relationship
between confidence and accuracy for studied words was positive for subjects in the ST
condition, r(20) = .51, p = .022, the SST condition, r(20) = .66, p = .001, and the STST
condition, r(20) = .84, p < .001.
Relative accuracy for studied words: Gamma. Gamma correlations were good for
studied words in both the ST (M = .66), SST (M = .74) and STST (M = .75) conditions.
A one-way ANOVA failed to detect any differences among these three groups, F(2, 56)
= .64, p = .529.
In sum, the ST, SST, and STST conditions did not show any differences in hit rate,
hit confidence, or the relationship between output dominance and hit rate. However, the
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Table 15
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on hit rate in
Experiment 3.
Variable

B

SE B

β

Printed frequency

-.01

.00

-.11

Output dominance

.00

.00

-.16*

Printed frequency

.00

.00

.02

Output dominance

.00

.00

.04

Printed frequency

.00

.00

.00

Output dominance

.00

.00

.01

Condition 1 (ST)

Condition 2 (SST)

Condition 3 (STST)

Note. First step (printed frequency only) not shown. In the ST condition, R2 = .00 for
Step 1 (p > .05), ΔR2 = .03 for Step 2 (p < .05). All other effects are nonsignificant (p > .
05). *p < .05.

75

Table 16
Across-subjects confidence-accuracy correlations as a function of word type in
Experiment 3.
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3
(ST)
(SST)
(STST)
Studied Items

.51

.66

.84

Related Lures

.20

.75

.43
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link between confidence and accuracy across subjects strengthened with additional study
or test periods. Resolution (i.e., gamma) was similar among the three conditions.
Recognition of Related Lures
False alarm rates and confidence ratings. False alarm rates for related lures and
confidence ratings can be found in Tables 13 and 14, respectively. A one-way ANOVA
detected an effect of condition on false alarm rate, F(2, 57) = 9.73, p < .001; Fisher LSD
tests confirmed that false alarms were lower in the STST condition than the other two
conditions.
Turning to confidence ratings, a one-way ANOVA examining the effect of condition
on confidence for false alarms only approached significance, F(2, 57), p = .078,
suggesting the possibility that subjects were more confident in false alarms in the ST
condition relative to the SST and STST conditions. A second one-way ANOVA to
analyze the effect of condition on confidence for correct rejections failed to detect any
differences, F(2, 57) = 1.42, p = .249.
Effects of output dominance on the false alarm rate. Multiple regression was
used to assess the effects of output dominance on false alarm rate for related lures while
controlling for printed frequency (as measured by log HAL). The results can be found in
Table 17. In the ST and SST conditions, printed frequency neither significantly predicted
false alarm rate nor explained a statistically significant proportion of variance in false
alarm rate. When output dominance was added to the regression equations in the ST and
SST conditions, though, it explained a significant amount of variance. In these
conditions, subjects were more likely to incorrectly respond “old” to higher output
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Table 17
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on false alarm
rate in Experiment 3.
Variable

B

SE B

β

Printed frequency

.00

.00

.07

Output dominance

-.01

.00

-.32*

Printed frequency

.00

.00

-.01

Output dominance

-.01

.00

-.40*

Printed frequency

.01

.00

.17*

Output dominance

.00

.00

-.15*

Condition 1 (ST)

Condition 2 (SST)

Condition 3 (STST)

Note. First step (printed frequency only) not shown. In the ST condition, R2 = .03 for
Step 1 (p < .05), ΔR2 = .10 for Step 2 (p < .05). In the SST condition, R2 = .01 for Step 1
(p > .05), ΔR2 = .14 for Step 2 (p < .05). In the STST condition, R2 = .05 for Step 1 (p < .
05), ΔR2 = .06 for Step 2 (p < .05). All other effects are nonsignificant (p > .05). *p < .05.
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dominance items than lower output dominance items. In contrast, in the STST condition,
both printed frequency and output dominance played a role in explaining false alarm rate;
subjects were more likely to false alarm to items of higher frequency or higher output
dominance than items of lower frequency or lower output dominance.
Metacognitive measures.
Absolute accuracy for related lures: Confidence-accuracy correlations. Table 16
depicts the across-subjects calibration plot for related lures. The relationship between
confidence and accuracy for related lures was not significant in the ST condition, r(20)
= .20, p = .411, but was significant in the SST condition, r(20) = .75, p < .001. The
correlation was marginally significant in the STST condition, r(20) = .43, p = .06.
Absolute accuracy for related and unrelated lures: Accuracy plots. Figures 8 and
9 depict the accuracy plots for related and unrelated lures, respectively. These curves
show that when recognition judgments (whether “old” or “new”) were made with higher
confidence, they were also more likely to be accurate. Differences emerge as a result of
experimental condition, however. Notably, subjects in the ST condition made the most
incorrect high confidence recognition decisions. Although accuracy corresponded with
confidence most strongly in the STST condition, all three groups were less accurate than
predicted by their confidence ratings when responding “old.”
Relative accuracy for related lures: Gamma. Gamma correlations for related lures
appeared to improve from the ST (M = .07) to the SST (M = .24) to the STST (M = .46)
conditions. A one-way ANOVA detected significant statistical differences among these
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Figure 8. The accuracy plot for Experiment 3 depicting subjects’ ability to discriminate
between studied words and related lures. The dotted line represents expected accuracy;
points above this line represent underconfidence, whereas points below this line represent
overconfidence.
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Figure 9. The accuracy plot for Experiment 3 depicting subjects’ ability to discriminate
between studied words and unrelated lures. The dotted line represents expected
accuracy; points above this line represent underconfidence, whereas points below this
line represent overconfidence.
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three groups, F(2, 57) = 7.28, p = .002. Fisher LSD post hoc comparisons indicated that
all comparisons were significant.
In sum, subjects in the STST condition incorrectly responded “old” less than
subjects in the ST and SST conditions to related lures, probably because of feedback
given after the first test. Output dominance was a predictor of false alarm rate in all three
conditions, however. An extra study or an extra study and test strengthened the
relationship between confidence and accuracy such that subjects in the SST and STST
conditions who were more accurate were also more confident. Subjects in the STST
condition also showed fewest false alarms and demonstrated the best memory resolution.
Effects of Output Dominance on Corrected Recognition
The effects of output dominance on corrected recognition (hits minus false alarms)
can be found in Table 18. In the ST and SST conditions, printed frequency neither
predicted corrected recognition nor explained a statistically significant proportion of
variance in corrected recognition. When output dominance was added to the regression
equation, however, it explained a significant proportion of variance in both conditions
such that items lower in output dominance were more likely to be correctly recognized.
In the STST condition, though, neither printed frequency nor output dominance had any
effect on corrected recognition.
Discussion
Experiment 3 resulted in several key findings. First, even when subjects were
provided with repeated exposure to categorized lists at study and at initial test, false
alarms were still more likely for category members of higher output dominance. As
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Table 18
Summary of multiple regression analysis for effects of output dominance on corrected
recognition in Experiment 3.
Variable

B

SE B

β

Printed frequency

-.01

.01

-.12

Output dominance

.00

.00

.14*

Printed frequency

.00

.01

.02

Output dominance

.01

.00

.36*

Printed frequency

-.01

.00

-.12

Output dominance

.00

.00

.11

Condition 1 (ST)

Condition 2 (SST)

Condition 3 (STST)

Note. First step (printed frequency only) not shown. In the ST condition, R2 = .03 for
Step 1 (p < .05), ΔR2 = .02 for Step 2 (p < .05). In the SST condition, R2 = .01 for Step 1
(p > .05), ΔR2 = .12 for Step 2 (p < .05). All other effects are nonsignificant (p > .05). *p
< .05.
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reported in Experiments 1 and 2, these patterns were not found for hits (except in the
Experiment 3 ST condition) — a failure to find the mirror effect of recognition memory
in these data. Experiment 3 also showed that providing subjects with an additional study
and test opportunity (as in the STST condition) statistically significantly lowered the false
alarm rate for related lures and improved metacognition for these difficult items.
Thus, the analysis of the response rates and mean confidence ratings in
Experiment 3 suggests that the study and test repetition in the STST condition led to
markedly improved performance in that condition relative to the ST condition, but that
only repeating the study phase (as in the SST condition) had no effect. This is an
interesting pattern of data and may provide a tie-in to literature on the testing effect (see
Roediger, Putnam, & Smith, 2011, for a review, but note that most testing research is
done with recall rather than recognition); repeated study (SST) has little effect on
subsequent performance, but interpolating a test with feedback (STST) substantially
reduces high confidence false alarms, improving recognition memory. Importantly,
however, neither of the experimental manipulations reduced the occurrence of false
memories to high output dominance members, suggesting that the processes causing
these types of memory errors in the ST condition persisted with repeated study (SST) and
repeated study and test (STST). On the other hand, overall metacognition, as shown
primarily by accuracy plots and gamma correlations, was poorest in the ST condition but
best in the STST condition.
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General Discussion
Table 19 presents a summary of the results of Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Across
these three experiments, subjects studied sets of words belonging to different semantic
categories. Experiment 1 demonstrated that after studying these materials, subjects were
highly likely to falsely recognize unstudied category members from studied categories.
More specifically, the likelihood of false recognition varied linearly with output
dominance such that category members that were more frequent in the norms (i.e., high
output dominance category members) were more likely to be falsely recognized than
category members that were less frequent. Output dominance was shown to affect false
recognition above and beyond lexical frequency. These patterns were not observed for
hits, however, a result inconsistent with the mirror effect in recognition memory (as well
as the word frequency effect more generally).
The findings in Experiment 1 are consistent with the work of Dewhurst (2001),
who manipulated output dominance in a similar yet less gradated fashion and found that
subjects were more likely to false alarm to high output dominance members than low
output dominance members. Dewhurst theorized that this effect was due to errors of both
spreading activation and source monitoring that occur during learning (encoding) and that
the reason subjects were more likely to falsely recognize high output dominance
members was because they were more likely to implicitly generate these members during
encoding relative to lower dominance members.Experiment 2 was designed to assess
another possible explanation of the negative relation between output dominance and false
alarm rate: that the composition of the test list (with half related and half unrelated lures)
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Table 19
Summary of Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
Variable

E1

E2

E3 (SST)

E3 (STST)

Hit Rate

.73

.70

.82

.71

Hit Confidence

82.6

84.2

86.2

85.3

Regression β

-.10

-.18*

.04

.00

ConfidenceAccuracy
Correlation

.68

.71

.66

.84

Gamma
Correlation

.73

.79

.74

.75

False Alarm Rate

.39

.29

.30

.14

False Alarm
Confidence

62.7

55.1

51.1

54.1

Regression β

-.45*

-.45*

-.40*

-.15*

ConfidenceAccuracy
Correlation

.23

.28

.75

.43

Gamma
Correlation

-.16

-.13

.24

.46

Corrected
Recognition β

.37*

.25*

.36*

.11

Memory for
Studied Words

Memory for
Related Lures

Note. E1 = Experiment 1; note that this was identical to the ST condition in Experiment
3. E2 = Experiment 2. E3 = Experiment 3. Regression β = beta weight for relationship
between output dominance and response rate, *p < .05. Corrected recognition means hits
minus false alarms.
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directed subjects toward using output dominance and category membership as diagnostic
cues at test, which led to a greater degree of error-prone processing. To investigate this
alternative explanation, Experiment 2 omitted the distractors that were unrelated to the
studied categories that were included in the final recognition test in Experiment 1. This
modification had a mixed effect: it reduced the overall false alarm rate for lures as
compared to Experiment 1, but failed to affect the relationship between output dominance
and false alarm rate. This observation was also consistent with the work of Dewhurst et
al. (2009), who investigated whether categorized list errors arise as a result of processes
that occur during encoding versus processes that occur during retrieval. The observation
in Experiment 2 supports the proposition that the associations made during encoding fuel
memory errors, as manipulating the structure of the test list did little to affect high
confidence false recognition for high output dominance category members.
Experiment 3 was designed to evaluate methods for improving subjects’
metacognitive monitoring in the categorized list procedure. This experiment featured
three different conditions: one an exact replication of Experiment 1 (ST), a second which
presented the study material to subjects twice before final test (SST), and a third in which
subjects studied the material, took a test in which they were given feedback, studied the
material a second time, and then took a final test (STST). Experiment 3 uncovered
several novel patterns of data. First, providing subjects with an additional repetition of
the study materials did little to reduce false alarm rate; only an interpolated test with
feedback, when combined with a study repetition, reduced false alarms and improved
metacognition. Even though false alarm rate was decreased in this condition, however,
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subjects were still more likely to false alarm to higher output dominance category
members than lower output dominance members.
These experiments can be integrated into prior research by offering a possible
explanation of how recognition memory operates for categorized list materials. When
subjects study categorized list words, they implicitly generate associates of those words.
More typical or frequent members of the category are more likely to be generated than
less frequent category members. Meanwhile, nonstudied category members receive small
amounts of categorical spreading activation as a result of the small degrees of overlap
between the studied words and representations of these other words in memory. At test,
subjects commit false alarms as a result of these two different processes. Previous
research suggests that recollection-based errors are produced by source memory errors
for items implicitly generated at test and familiarity-based errors are produced by
summation of small degrees of match between memory representation and test word
when this summation passes a certain threshold (Dewhurst, 2001). Because implicit
generation of category members occurs at encoding and not at retrieval, as suggested by
Dewhurst et al. (2009), manipulating the test list (as in Experiment 2) did not result in a
reduction of false alarms for high dominance category members found in Experiment 1.
Providing subjects with an additional opportunity to study the categorized list
words enhanced the memory traces for the studied items. On the other hand, repeated
study did not reduce — and may have even increased — the likelihood that nonstudied
category members were generated at encoding. As a result, although memory
performance improves overall when a second study opportunity is provided, a high
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number of memory errors (false alarms) still occur for high output dominance category
members. Providing subjects with an intermediate test and then a second study
opportunity mitigates these effects by providing subjects with an opportunity to edit the
contents of memory for persistent errors; namely, eliminating any source monitoring
errors that arose between first study and intermediate test.
These results can also be partially explained by models of episodic memory such
as the subjective likelihood model (SLiM; McClelland & Chappell, 1998) or the
retrieving effectively from memory model (REM; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997; although
see Criss & McClelland, 2006, for a distinction). These models address the important
effects of differentiation — that is, repetition or increased study time for study material
— on recognition memory. According to these models, subjects respond “old” when
there is a large degree of match between an encoded memory representation and word at
test (similar to the Arndt & Hirshman [1998] theory discussed earlier). Every time a
word is restudied, it is added to the preexisting memory trace, which becomes richer and
more feature-filled as a result. This memory trace enrichment makes it more likely that
subjects will respond “old” to words that were actually studied, since these
representations feature the highest degree of match with a given studied word at test. As
memory traces become enriched through restudy or repetition, the likelihood that they
will match to a lure word is also decreased.
Differentiation, as explained by SLiM and REM, is used in this context to explain
the mirror effect, which is traditionally a troubling finding for recognition memory
theorists. These theories dovetail nicely, however, with the more associative-based
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account of Dewhurst (2001) and colleagues to explain the Experiment 3 findings. When
categorized lists are restudied, the individual traces for each word become enriched,
leading to improved differentiation at final test. However, increasing the number of times
a categorized list is presented increases the possibility that nonstudied category members
may be implicitly generated during encoding. This means that despite the improved
differentiation provided by repeated list presentation, the possibility of source memory
errors still exists. When subjects make source memory errors on a test with feedback,
they have an opportunity to edit memory for these items, possibly invoking a greater
degree of controlled processing to do so. Subjects may continue to generate category
associates during an intermediate test or during the second presentation of the material (in
the STST condition), however, leading to the lower rate of false alarms to high output
dominance members demonstrated in this condition.
This set of experiments also highlights the ways categorized lists can be used to
study false memories. As shown with these materials, critical items need not be the most
common, or even the five most common, members of the category to evoke reliable false
alarms — rather, items that are studied and tested from categorized lists can be taken
from any subset of the ordered, vertically-associated categories. These experiments
demonstrated one powerful way this can be done: by presenting alternate items and
testing across all of them to obtain hit, miss, false alarm, and correct rejection rates for
each item as well as each output dominance position. Calculating response rates and
confidence ratings for different output dominance positions allows investigation of the
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relationships between output dominance and the variable of interest with correlation
coefficients or regression.
This paper used this more nuanced methodology to examine the linear
relationships between output dominance and response rates. The findings reported here
further establish and refine the account provided by Dewhurst et al. (2009) and suggest
two explanations as to why errors may arise in the categorized list procedure. This
account provides information about the processing that takes place during the encoding
and retrieval of items that are organized categorically. In particular, studying some items
from the same semantic category appears to affect memory for related category members.
These effects seem to be related to the output dominance or typicality of a given category
member and the ease with which that category member comes to mind, and these
findings differentiate processing that occurs for categorized list material from associative
lists (e.g., DRM lists) and even for frequent versus infrequent words in the lexicon.
Conclusion
In summary, the categorized list procedure presents both theoretical and
methodological advantages over other popular procedures for investigating false
memories. Theoretically, categorized lists provide a closer look at the processes that
come into play in category learning, prototypicality, and instance generation;
methodologically, categorized lists make it easier to vary lure “strength” and have more
than one critical item per list (as compared to the DRM procedure). The flexibility of the
categorized list procedure makes it an ideal vehicle for the further investigation of many
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of the ideas touched on in this thesis: effects of word frequency, implicit generation
effects during encoding, differentiation, and the testing effect.
The three experiments reported here used the categorized list procedure to show
high levels of false recognition for high output dominance category members in a pattern
above and beyond the effects of word frequency. These effects were partly attributed to
source monitoring errors that arose as a result of implicit generation of nonstudied
associates to studied lists at encoding. These findings were supported by the observation
that manipulating the test list (the retrieval phase) did little to eliminate the relatively high
number of false alarms for high output dominance category members; this pattern was so
robust that it could not be attenuated by providing subjects with additional study and test
periods. The persistence of these false alarms to high output dominance category
members, and the processes that cause them, will be a necessary topic for future research.
The initial findings reported here suggest that additional study and test repetitions provide
a useful means for modulating recognition memory errors.
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Appendix
Categorized lists:
a bird
1. eagle
2. robin
3. bluejay
4. cardinal
5. hawk
6. bluebird
7. crow
8. hummingbird
9. parrot
10. sparrow
11. pigeon
12. seagull
13. dove
14. parakeet
15. falcon
16. canary
17. owl
18. ostrich
19. penguin
20. raven
a fish
1. salmon
2. trout
3. goldfish
4. catfish
5. tuna
6. shark
7. flounder
8. swordfish
9. herring
10. carp
11. cod
12. angelfish
13. dolphin
14. blowfish

15. guppy
16. halibut
17. marlin
18. minnow
19. piranha
20. snapper
an insect
1. fly
2. ant
3. spider
4. bee
5. mosquito
6. beetle
7. ladybug
8. grasshopper
9. butterfly
10. wasp
11. roach
12. moth
13. gnat
14. caterpillar
15. centipede
16. cricket
17. worm
18. mantis
19. dragonfly
20. flea
a vegetable
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

carrot
lettuce
broccoli
cucumber
pea
corn
potato
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8. celery
9. onion
10. spinach
11. squash
12. bean
13. cauliflower
14. cabbage
15. radish
16. asparagus
17. pepper
18. beet
19. turnip
20. zucchini
a musical instrument
1. drum
2. guitar
3. flute
4. piano
5. trumpet
6. clarinet
7. violin
8. saxophone
9. trombone
10. tuba
11. cello
12. oboe
13. viola
14. harp
15. keyboard
16. piccolo
17. banjo
18. harmonica
19. cymbal
20. tambourine
an article of clothing

1. shirt
2. ants
3. sock
4. underwear
5. shoe
6. hat
7. shorts
8. jacket
9. sweater
10. skirt
11. jeans
12. coat
13. dress
14. glove
15. sweatshirt
16. scarf
17. blouse
18. tie
19. belt
20. undershirt
a weather phenomenon
1. tornado
2. hurricane
3. rain
4. snow
5. hail
6. flood
7. lightning
8. blizzard
9. earthquake
10. sleet
11. monsoon
12. thunder
13. tsunami
14. wind
15. storm
16. typhoon
17. drought
18. cloud
19. sunshine
20. drizzle

a sport
1. football
2. basketball
3. soccer
4. baseball
5. tennis
6. hockey
7. swimming
8. golf
9. volleyball
10. lacrosse
11. track
12. rugby
13. softball
14. skiing
15. cheerleading
16. running
17. gymnastics
18. polo
19. raquetball
20. wrestling
an occupation or
profession
1. doctor
2. teacher
3. lawyer
4. nurse
5. professor
6. accountant
7. psychologist
8. dentist
9. engineer
10. secretary
11. manager
12. cook
13. firefighter
14. policeman
15. athlete
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16. banker
17. carpenter
18. janitor
19. scientist
20. student
a fruit
1. apple
2. orange
3. banana
4. grape
5. pear
6. peach
7. strawberry
8. kiwi
9. pineapple
10. watermelon
11. tomato
12. plum
13. grapefruit
14. mango
15. cherry
16. lemon
17. blueberry
18. cantaloupe
19. raspberry
20. lime
a part of the human
body
1. leg
2. arm
3. finger
4. head
5. toe
6. eye
7. hand
8. nose
9. ear
10. foot

11. mouth
12. stomach
13. heart
14. knee
15. neck
16. brain
17. hair
18. elbow
19. shoulder
20. chest
a four legged animal

1. dog
2. cat
3. horse
4. lion
5. bear
6. tiger
7. cow
8. elephant
9. deer
10. mouse
11. pig
12. rat

13. giraffe
14. squirrel
15. rabbit
16. goat
17. zebra
18. moose
19. sheep
20. cheetah

Items are listed in order of highest to lowest output dominance. Specifically, the item in
Position 1 has the highest output dominance and the item in Position 20 has the lowest.

Unrelated items:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

adjective
aluminum
amethyst
anaconda
aspen
axe
barge
battleship
bazooka
blender
brass
butter
cabin
cabinet
cave
cedar
chapel
cobra
coffee
conjunction
cousin

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

curry
daughter
day
decade
denim
diamond
dogwood
essay
father
ferry
fleece
flyer
futon
garnet
gin
governor
grass
grenade
igloo
iris
island
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

kayak
ketchup
kilometer
ladle
lawnmower
lead
letter
level
lilac
liquor
magazine
mansion
mayor
micrometer
mile
milk
millimeter
minute
monastery
nail
nanosecond

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

nickel
niece
noun
nylon
oil
opal
ottoman
palm
pamphlet
petunia
pick
pitchfork
plow
preposition
president
pronoun
python
raft
rattlesnake
recliner
rifle
river
rock
rose
rum
sanctuary
sander
sapphire
screwdriver
senator
shovel
soda
sofa
son
spruce
stove
sugar
sword
synagogue
temple
tent
tongs
townhouse

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

treasurer
velvet
vinegar
violet
viper
vodka
week
whisk
whiskey
wine
wool
wrench
yard
zinc
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